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This paper documents and analyses gross job flows and their determinants in
Ukraine using a dataset of more than 2200 Ukrainian firms operating in manufac-
turing and non-manufacturing for the years 1998–2000. Job destruction dominates
job creation in both 1999 and 2000. Another clear-cut result of our analysis is the strong
positive effect of new private firms on net employment growth. We also find an
inverse relationship between job reallocation and size for both manufacturing and
non-manufacturing, while only in the latter sector is employment growth inversely
related with size. The main focus of the paper is the effect of trade flows on employ-
ment adjustment in manufacturing. Our results show that both employment growth
and job reallocation at the firm and two-digit sector level are affected by strong expo-
sure to import competition and product market competition in export markets.
These effects are more pronounced when we consider trade flows to the world at
large and to the EU than when the analysis is based on trade flows to the CIS.
JEL Classifications: E24, F14, J63, P23.
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It is generally known that flexibility of the labour market is an important feature
of well-functioning market economies. Davis and Haltiwanger (1999, 1992) and
Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998) report that in the US and in Canada
roughly one in every ten jobs is created and one in every ten jobs is destroyed each
year. Flexibility of the labour market is important because it permits the rapid
reallocation of resources to the most efficient uses and thus it may be vital for
economic growth. As suggested by Aghion and Howitt (1994), we might expect
a relationship between gross job creation, destruction and productivity growth.
Firms (sectors) that engage in restructuring destroy low productivity jobs and
create high productivity ones. This leads to high job turnover, an increase in labour
productivity and better general performance. However, a high degree of job real-
location may also have negative effects, at least in the short run, in terms of worker
displacement and earnings losses, but the aggregate and long-run benefits are
more likely to compensate for the individual costs.
These issues are particularly relevant for the post-communist economies, char-
acterized by highly distorted factor allocations and many inefficient firms. The
reallocation of labour from inefficient firms (usually non-restructured state and
privatized firms) to efficient ones (usually new private and restructured state and
privatized firms) is a desirable feature of a successful transition from plan to mar-
ket. How job creation and destruction have contributed to this reallocation process
has been the subject of a small burgeoning literature on gross job flows in Central
Europe and the CIS. 
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) analyse the role of labour market flexibility
for Estonia. According to their findings, Estonia’s transition process can be charac-
terized as successful. The country’s approach to rapid reform has led the economy
to sustainable GDP growth and to rates of job reallocation similar to those reported
for Western economies. Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996) analyse gross flows
of jobs in Poland at the start of transition and find high rates of gross job destruc-
tion, which are concentrated in state-owned enterprises. This suggests that state-
owned enterprises in Poland rapidly engaged in downsizing. They also find that
new private firms contribute disproportionately to job growth in the economy. The
same patterns are found for most of the other Central and East European countries
as shown in Faggio and Konings (2001). 
The purpose of this paper is to study gross flows of jobs in Ukraine, a transition
country that has been lagging behind in reforms. The paper focuses on the years
1998–2000, when Ukraine finally started to come out of a prolonged depression
that lasted nearly a decade. Figure 1 shows the dismal performance of the Ukrain-
ian economy over the nineties, with precipitous falls of GDP and real wages and
a modest decline of employment. Wage flexibility, forced unpaid leave and wage
arrears on a scale even larger than in Russia can explain the diverging trends
of GDP and employment. What explains the overall dismal performance in the
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nineties? Some oligarchs, their co-opted cronies in parliament and the presidential
administration, most of whom came from the Communist nomenclatura, had an
iron grip on most economic activity in Ukraine throughout the nineties. These
groups had captured all organs of the state and used them to their private eco-
nomic benefit, maintaining weak property rights and an over-regulation of the
privatized and emerging new private sector (Aslund, 2002). In essence, supply was
shackled by a ‘bad equilibrium’ of maximized rent-seeking by the oligarchs and
their cronies and the overpowering presence of government bodies over-regulating
economic agents, making Ukraine one of the most corrupt countries in the world.
However, in 1998 and 1999 Ukraine experienced a severe balance of payments
crisis leading to the first serious and quite radical reforms under the Yushchenko
government, which successfully broke the iron grip of the oligarchs and liberalized
supply for the first time in 2000 (Aslund, 2002). While the jury is still out on




 the evidence we
shall present on job flows shows a clear hiatus between the nineties and the year
2000. 
Konings and Walsh (1999a, b) use survey data based on small samples to docu-
ment gross job flows in Ukraine and Russia in the early nineties. They report job




 Once the balance of payments crisis had passed, the oligarchs managed to push prime minister Yushchenko
out of the government, which does not bode well for the future.
Figure 1. GDP, employment and real wage dynamics in Ukraine: 1990–2000
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Ukraine in 1996 and of 16.7 percent in Russia in 1994. In contrast, in both countries
they find rather modest job creation in the first half of the nineties, not exceed-
ing 3 percent. They explain the high job destruction in Ukraine and Russia with
the existence of ‘disorganization’ in the production process (see, for example,
Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; Roland and Verdier, 1999). 
Apart from the two cited papers by Konings and Walsh there are some impor-
tant studies on the reallocation process in the economies of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). For Russia, Brown and Earle (2002a) find that job
destruction and reallocation rose markedly after the beginning of reforms and that
job destruction was concentrated among the less productive firms in the second
half of the nineties. Konings and Lehmann (2002), in addition, show that five years
into the Russian transition employment responses in privatized firms are more
strongly negatively correlated with wage movements than in state-owned firms
pointing to the slowly emerging beneficial effects of privatization on productivity.
The datasets of both cited papers on Russia do not include new private firms; their
contribution to the employment growth of the Russian economy is documented by
Acquisti and Lehmann (2000). According to their evidence new private firms have




 destruction rates, the latter of which might
be attributed to a relatively hostile environment for new businesses in Russia and
the inexperience of managers to operate in this environment. Brown and Earle





 provide evidence that the reforms undertaken in both countries
had an impact on firm-level restructuring and labour reallocation. They also show
that in Russia and Ukraine this labour reallocation has enhanced productivity and
that these effects manifested themselves more rapidly in faster reforming Russia
than in ‘laggard’ Ukraine.
Our paper makes several contributions. The paper has as one aim to document
gross job flows in both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors in
Ukraine for the years 1999 and 2000, when Ukraine for the first time embarked on
consistent reforms resulting in strong positive growth in the year 2000 (Aslund,
2002). We use large representative samples of firms in both the manufacturing and
the non-manufacturing sectors, in order to compare and contrast gross job flows in
these two sectors. Since the Ukrainian economy was even more biased towards the
manufacturing sector under central planning than other Soviet and East European
economies, it is of interest to see whether there are significant differences in net
employment growth between the two sectors that lead to a shrinking of the manu-
facturing sector and an expansion of the non-manufacturing sector as a move in
the direction of a market economy would suggest. Of particular interest in this
context is whether job creation or job destruction is the driving force behind this




‘Traditional’ firms are firms that already existed in Soviet times, so new private firms are excluded from
their analysis.
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The data that we use have information on ownership types of firms, i.e., we
can distinguish between new private, privatized and state-owned enterprises. This
allows us to contribute to the on-going debate about the effects of ownership on
employment growth. Many papers have indicated that the employment adjust-
ment in terms of gross flows of jobs is not very different between privatized and





The third and most innovative contribution of this paper is the exploration of
the link between the exposure of Ukrainian manufacturing industries to foreign
trade and employment adjustment by firms operating in these industries. One
strand of the Western literature on gross job flows considers the link between
foreign trade and job creation and destruction tying it in with the debate on the
effects of globalization on employment in the domestic labour market. For ex-
ample, Levinsohn (1999) explores the effects of trade liberalization on the Chilean
labour market and finds that size and macro effects overwhelm any trade effects.
Once size and macro shocks are controlled for, export-led, import-competing and
non-traded sectors have similar employment patterns. Klein, Schuh and Triest
(2003) identify trade-related adjustment costs by estimating the effects of real
exchange rates on labour reallocation using detailed data on US manufacturing
industries for the years 1973 through 1993. 
In a transition context, the effects of trade on job reallocation have been over-
looked, even though the rapid opening up of transition economies to world
markets seems to come close to a natural experiment. Trade ties of Ukrainian
manufacturing sectors with Western (European Union) markets were virtually
non-existent before independence, but have developed rapidly since then. Some
sectors, however, developed strong links with Western markets in the nineties
while other sectors remained relatively closed. We exploit these differences to
investigate how the relative openness of a sector, in which a firm operates, impacts
upon the creation and destruction of jobs in this firm. We also investigate how
relative openness affects gross job flows at the two-digit sector level. 
In the next section we describe the various datasets employed in the analysis
of gross job flows and provide a brief review of the job flow measures. The sub-
sequent section looks at foreign trade flows of Ukrainian manufacturing over the
nineties and presents and discusses the construction of indices of relative openness
at the sector level. Section 4 reports gross flows of jobs for the entire economy, for
different sectors in the economy and ownership categories. It also discusses these
flows according to employment size categories and to the relative openness of the




E.g. Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996); Bilsen and Konings (1998); Acquisti and Lehmann (2000) and
Richter and Schaffer (1996). In contrast, Konings and Lehmann (2002) find different employment adjustment
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determination of employment growth and job reallocation at the firm level as well
as estimates of the impact of relative openness on job flows at the sector level. The
final section summarizes our main findings.
 
2. Data and job flow measures
 
We use two firm/establishment-level datasets in our work. The first dataset covers
7,303 ‘traditional’ establishments in manufacturing between 1996 and 2000, of which
6,189 have positive employment levels in all years. This data on the manufactur-
ing sector is provided by the Government Statistical Committee (‘Derzhkomstat’)
and covers virtually the entire population of those manufacturing establish-
ments that already existed in Soviet times, allowing one to study the evolution
of job flows over time for the ‘traditional’ manufacturing sector, which, as stated




 The use of this dataset is twofold. First, as a
check of whether the job flow measures generated from the second data source
are reasonable, and second, we use information on employment as an important
building block for our relative openness indices.
The second dataset is based on annual company accounts data of 2,239 Ukrain-
ian firms in both the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sectors, where
we have annual observations for the years 1998–2000. These data are retrieved from
the Amadeus database compiled by Bureau Van Dijck, a commercial data provider.
The Amadeus database consists mostly of company accounts data of European
Union firms, however, it also reports information on some countries in Central and
Eastern Europe. To be included in the database at least one of the following criteria
has to be fulfilled: operating revenue must be at least 1.5 million Euro, total assets
must be at least 3 million Euro or the number of employees has to be larger than
15. These restrictions on the data imply that micro firms are not included. Never-
theless, a substantial number of medium sized and small firms enter the data.
Abstracting from micro firms, the data is assumed to be a random sample of the
population of firms and enables us to infer some basic patterns of job reallocation
in Ukraine. The manufacturing sample covers roughly one-third of all employment
in manufacturing, while the data from non-manufacturing sectors comprise about
9 percent of total non-manufacturing employment over this period.
The Amadeus dataset includes the company names of all firms and based on
this information it is possible to determine that the data overwhelmingly relate
to establishments. Only 2 percent of firms in the overall sample have more than




This has been done in the above-mentioned comparative study by Brown and Earle (2002b). They con-
vincingly show that new private firms do not enter the Derzhkomstat ‘register’ of manufacturing establish-
ments. Note that the survey procedures of the Russian and Ukrainian statistical offices, like in Soviet times,













 The information on company names also allows
us to match ownership information of each firm from an external source. Con-
sequently, we are able to identify new private firms, privatized firms and state-
owned enterprises. 
The dataset that we use in the analysis comprises only firms that we can iden-
tify with certainty as continuing firms, i.e., firms that have positive employment
levels in all years. 
While the Amadeus dataset has the advantage that it includes new private firms
and firms in the non-manufacturing sector, it is restricted to the years 1998–2000.
These are, however, the years when the Ukrainian economy started to emerge from
nearly a decade of decline and stagnation as discussed previously. In addition,
throughout this stagnation period forced unpaid leave was a very widespread prac-
tice of Ukrainian firms, generating potentially large biases in job flow measures.
At the end of the nineties the incidence of forced unpaid leave was dramatically




Table 1 gives some summary statistics of the Amadeus dataset for the years




These firms are Ukrainian Telekom, Lviv-Railways and Odessa-Railways. Throughout the rest of the




For a more detailed discussion of measurement error connected to forced unpaid leave, see Konings,
Kupets and Lehmann (2002).
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very large compared to the typical Western firms. Furthermore, not surprisingly
for transition economies, the average firm is larger in the manufacturing sector
than in the non-manufacturing sector. But even in the non-manufacturing sector
the average firm size is quite large compared to Western standards, as the bench-
mark figures for Belgium and the UK in Table 1, taken from the Amadeus data-
base, show. 
We can also note that the average employment growth rates in the sample are
negative in both sectors, with average employment contraction in the manufactur-
ing sector being larger in absolute value in both years. 










) is the sum of all employment losses in all contracting firms in an econ-
omy or sector. Usually gross job destruction is expressed as a positive number.
These gross job flows can be expressed as rates by dividing them by the total
amount of jobs available in an economy or sector. The sum of the gross job crea-










be observed in aggregate statistics. A measure of churning or reallocation of jobs
which is over and above the amount of job reallocation necessary to accommodate





) and is defined as the gross job reallocation rate minus the modulus of the




 as a measure of genu-
ine labour reallocation within a sector.
The shares of job creation and destruction of specific sectors or categories of
firms are given by the ratio of the number of created or destroyed jobs of these
sectors/categories of firms over the number of all created or destroyed jobs. These
shares establish the absolute contribution of sectors/categories to job creation or
job destruction, but comparisons of job flow shares with employment size shares
also give insights into their relative contributions. 





 that remain filled at the sampling date one year later. The one-year persist-
ence rate of job destruction is the fraction of jobs that do not reappear at the
sampling date one year later (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999). These persistence
rates document whether the observed job flows are of a temporary or more perma-
nent nature, an issue of particular relevance in the transition context.
Because the Amadeus data are not census-type data, the presented job flow
rates are estimates and it is, therefore, important to establish the precision of these
estimates by providing standard errors. One way to generate these standard errors,









Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) present alternative ways to compute standard errors of job flow
rates, requiring knowledge of sampling weights.
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thus far has been used seldom in the literature on gross job flows in transition
economies even when small random samples were analysed instead of census-type
data.
 
3. Trade flows and the relative openness of manufacturing sectors
 
We use the changing trade patterns of the Ukrainian manufacturing sectors to inves-
tigate how the opening up of an economy to world markets affects employment
adjustment at the firm and sector level. We, therefore, first discuss these chang-
ing trade patterns and then describe the construction of indices that attempt to
capture this opening up of an economy.
We have two sets of trade data available in our work. The Ukrainian State
Customs Committee provides trade data by country of origin and destination for




 We mapped these groups to
NACE2 commodity groups at the two-digit level. From an external source we are
also able to match the value of imports and exports at the firm level into our
Amadeus dataset. 
The large increase in trade flows to and from Western countries that Ukrainian
manufacturing sectors have experienced since independence can be inferred from
figures 2–4, which show annual total trade, import and export flows to and from
three geographic areas, the world as a whole, the European Union (EU) and the
CIS for the years 1994–2001. The presented flows are restricted to those sectors,
which are included in the Amadeus dataset, and are based on Ukrainian customs
house data, only available since 1994. Figures 2–4 and Tables A1 and A2 in the
appendix show several noteworthy trends. First, trade to and from the world at
large has risen between 1994 and 2001 by roughly two-thirds, with a particular
steep rise of EU trade (by ca. 300 percent), while CIS trade has been slightly declin-
ing. As a consequence the share of EU trade has roughly doubled in this period
and the CIS share has been more than halved. Secondly, while imports from the
EU increased dramatically, the rise in exports to the EU is spectacular, exceeding
the growth in imports by nearly 100 percentage points. However, most of this growth
occurred in the last three years of the reported period. Thirdly, the EU trade flow
levels in 1994 are low, and we assume that at the beginning of transition they were
close to zero. This inference seems especially valid for export flows (Figure 4).
Using the trade data at the sector level we first construct the following index of
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Figure 2. Total trade flows of manufacturing sector in Ukraine, 1994–2001
Source: Ukrainian State Customs Committee. Only sectors used in the manufacturing sample of the
Amadeus dataset are included.
Figure 3. Import flows of manufacturing sector in Ukraine, 1994–2001
Source: Ukrainian State Customs Committee.
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The index gives the relative share of imports and exports, i.e., of total trade








, weighted by its employment share in 1996. As no reliable
data on employment at the sector level are available, the employment levels are agg-





employ a smoothed version of this index, taking averages over the years 1996–98,
so that any short-run shocks, e.g., terms of trade shocks, are averaged out. Averag-
ing over the indicated years generates an index, which is exogenous to the analysed
gross job flows of the years 1999 and 2000. This index is calculated for world, EU
and CIS trade flows.
For the first two trading areas, and especially for the EU area, the index tries
to measure the relative degree, with which a respective sector in manufacturing




 Assuming that at the beginning
of transition EU trade flows of Ukrainian manufacturing were close to zero, the
relative level of a sector averaged over the years 1996–98 tells us the relative
change of this sector, i.e., it proxies for the relative speed, with which a sector




Employment is a measure of economic activity, which is far from perfect in the Ukrainian context given
the amount of forced unpaid leave. However, under the assumption of roughly proportional incidence of
unpaid leave across manufacturing sectors, the calculated employment shares do provide reliable relative




An index measuring the absolute level of openness of a sector employed by Klein, Schuh and Triest (2003)
might be preferable but requires reliable data on production, unavailable in the Ukrainian case.
Figure 4. Export flows of manufacturing sector in Ukraine, 1994–2001
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investigate how relative openness of a sector affects employment adjustment at the
firm and sector level. 
Ukraine as part of the former Soviet Union has trade flows to and from coun-
tries within the CIS (mainly Russia) that were, of course, intra-country flows of
goods before independence. A high relative level in CIS trade flows of a sector in
manufacturing might reflect the re-establishment of previously existing trade links
between enterprises, i.e., the attenuation of the problems of ‘disorganization’ dis-
cussed for example by Blanchard and Kremer (1997), Roland and Verdier (1999)
and Konings and Walsh (1999a), or it might represent a genuine opening up of this
sector to competition within CIS economies.
We are not able to identify these alternative scenarios with the data at our
disposal. The firm-level import data cover only that part of firms’ input require-
ments originating outside Ukraine. Aggregating firm-level imports up to two-digit
sector levels and using these aggregates to construct an index of relative import
intensity along the lines of the above index will not necessarily say much about
how well a sector has re-established supply chains. Some sectors might rely pre-
dominantly on suppliers from within Ukraine and some sectors on suppliers from
other CIS countries. Employing the customs house data, we simply investigate
whether CIS trade flows result in different employment adjustment by firms and
sectors than world and EU trade flows.
In order to get additional insights into how trade affects employment growth
and job reallocation, we also construct the indices of relative openness separating

















































































where the indices have a similar interpretation to that of the index based on total
trade flows. Summary statistics of the various indices, based on the 26 manufactur-
ing sectors in the Amadeus dataset, are given in Table A3. The figures of the index
based on EU-exports are particularly striking, pointing to a large number of sectors
that are very little engaged in exports to the EU area, and to a small number of
sectors that are very strongly involved in export activities to the EU. The five
most open sectors with respect to EU exports are (in descending order): recycling;
manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; manufacture
of wearing apparel; manufacture of fabricated metal products; manufacture of
leather and leather products. 
One reason for developing indices based on imports and exports separately is
that sectors that are particularly open to imports might not be especially export
intensive. This conjecture is in part confirmed in Table A4, where Spearman rank
correlation coefficients are shown for the various indices. The high and significant
coefficient of the import and export indices for the CIS trading area and the low
and insignificant coefficient of the same indices for the EU trading area imply that
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sectors that are import intensive are also export intensive as far as trade with the
CIS is concerned, while those sectors that are more exposed to import competition
from EU countries are not the sectors that rank high in exports to this trade area. 
Both the import- and the export-based indices proxy for a varying degree of
product market competition in either domestic markets or markets abroad, since
the customs house data, from which they are derived, relate to products groups




 Increased competitive pressure is associ-
ated in the literature with firm behaviour that leads to productivity gains, to con-




Thus competitive pressure might positively affect employment growth and job
turnover at the firm level. This latter result can come about because firms in sec-
tors faced with external competition have more incentives for constant productivity
increases, and consequently have high turnover of employees. Whether import com-
petition and competition in export markets lead to similar employment policies
by firms is, however, not entirely clear though it is worth investigating. One note-
worthy and obvious difference between import competition and competition in
export markets is that all firms in a sector experiencing strong import competi-
tion face the competitive pressure, while only those firms in a strongly export-




(2003) for example show that US establishments confronted with this pressure
are more efficient than other establishments in the same sector. We take account of
this difference in the firm-level regressions by interacting the relative openness
index, which is based on exports, with a dummy if the firm is observed to have
exports in the years 1996–98. Before we turn to these regressions we present some
basic patterns of job creation and job destruction in the years 1999 and 2000. 
 
4. Basic patterns of job creation and destruction in Ukraine
Table 2 presents the distributions of employment growth rates13 for various years
using both the Amadeus and the Derzhkomstat datasets. The Amadeus-based dis-
tributions for manufacturing are calculated for all firms and for ‘traditional’ firms,
i.e., without new private firms. For both 1999 and 2000 the mean growth rates
are negative in the overall sample of the Amadeus data as in the sub-samples of
manufacturing and non-manufacturing. The same holds for the four years of the
11 In other words, the data do not relate to imports by an industry, but imports of goods, which this
industry produces. Also note that we do not have trade data on intermediate and final goods, so it is hard
to disentangle whether Ukrainian firms are genuinely exposed to competition in export markets or whether
they are mainly involved in transfer pricing activities.
12 Repkine and Walsh (1999) discuss these issues in the context of transition.
13 Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and most subsequent research on job flows measure the employment





























Table 2. Distribution of year-by-year employment growth rates




98–99 −0.665 −0.341 −0.241 −0.158 −0.092 0.002 0.163 0.342 0.851 −0.061 0.254




98–99 −0.582 −0.293 −0.230 −0.155 −0.094 −0.011 0.111 0.269 0.800 −0.065 0.216
99–00 −0.974 −0.482 −0.308 −0.138 −0.036 0.024 0.100 0.194 0.763 −0.073 0.248
Amadeus ‘traditional’
Manufacturing n = 1213
98–99 −0.582 −0.293 −0.230 −0.155 −0.096 −0.016 0.088 0.187 0.580 −0.077 0.190




98–99 −0.942 −0.404 −0.262 −0.161 −0.088 0.023 0.225 0.436 0.885 −0.055 0.296




96–97 −0.621 −0.308 −0.234 −0.144 −0.070 0.000 0.061 0.126 0.475 −0.078 0.185
97–98 −0.744 −0.321 −0.229 −0.130 −0.055 0.005 0.075 0.143 0.529 −0.065 0.197
98–99 −0.748 −0.339 −0.248 −0.141 −0.058 0.005 0.080 0.163 0.477 −0.072 0.196
99–00 −1.126 −0.537 −0.340 −0.168 −0.056 0.022 0.102 0.192 0.503 −0.098 0.264
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growth rates derived from the Derzhkomstat data. For all years and both datasets,
we observe a zero growth rate at the 75th percentile. This implies that slightly less
than three-quarters of all firms destroy jobs, while roughly one-quarter creates jobs
in each year. The mean growth rates of the overall sample of the Amadeus dataset
are in both years (with values of −0.061 percent and −0.062 percent) lower than the
(negative) growth rates implied by the employment levels in Figure 1, which
amount roughly to −0.02 percent. The lack of micro firms in the Amadeus dataset
might explain some of this discrepancy since these firms might contribute to job
creation in a particularly strong fashion. 
The distributions of employment growth based on the Derzhkomstat data are
relatively compressed in the first three years for which we have data; in the year
2000 the distribution becomes more dispersed as shown in the increase of the stand-
ard deviation. We see a similar jump in the standard deviation between 1999 and
2000 with the Amadeus-based ‘traditional’ manufacturing firms. In the case of
the latter, the wider distribution is mainly brought about because of higher levels
of labour shedding by some firms, since at the 5th percentile, for example, the
growth rate falls from −0.293 to −0.475. We see a similar pattern of higher levels of
labour shedding in the Derzhkomstat-based distributions. In non-manufacturing,
the wider distribution is a result both of more labour shedding and of an increase
in employment expansion by some firms. At the 5th percentile we see a decrease in
the growth rate from −0.404 to −0.598 and an increase at the 95th percentile from
0.436 to 0.554 over the two years. Heterogeneity in employment behaviour clearly
increased in the year 2000 in this sector. 
Inspection of the Amadeus-based distributions of all manufacturing and of
‘traditional’ manufacturing firms leads us to conclude that the large majority of
new private firms is expanding employment in both years; up to the 75th percentile
the two distributions are virtually identical, while we find lower growth rates
throughout the upper tail of the ‘traditional’ manufacturing distributions. Also, the
latter distributions are roughly in line with the Derzhkomstat-based distributions
for the years 1999 and 2000. 
Most of the job flow rates that we present are estimates based on the Amadeus
dataset. Only Table 5 shows job flow measures of manufacturing based on the
census-type Derzhkomstat data. In all the tables based on the Amadeus data boot-
strapped standard errors of the job flow measures are reported. These standard
errors, which are based on 1000 repetitions, allow us to establish the precision of
the estimates. Using various distributional assumptions, this enables us to con-
struct confidence intervals and thus to compare job flow rates across categories
in a statistically meaningful way. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals of the
job flow measures are similar whether one imposes a normal distribution or uses
the percentile method.14 For the purposes of the paper it suffices to double the
14 For a discussion of how to construct confidence intervals from bootstrapped standard errors, see Efron
and Tibshirani (1993). The confidence intervals are not presented but are available on request.
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shown standard error to get a satisfactory approximation of half of the width of
the confidence interval.
Table 3 presents estimates of the job flow rates using the overall sample of the
Amadeus dataset. Table 4 shows estimates of these rates and of gross job flow
shares and size shares after the dataset has been split into manufacturing and non-
manufacturing. While job destruction dominates job creation in the Ukrainian
economy in both years, job creation rises and job destruction falls in 2000 compared
with 1999. As already stated, heterogeneity in employment behaviour increased
in 2000 as shown by the doubling of the excess job reallocation rate. In addition,
given the bootstrapping procedure, the increase in the bootstrap standard errors
from 1999 to 2000 for all job flow measures apart from the job destruction rate tells
us that job creation but not job destruction has become more heterogeneous in
2000.15
The manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors have very similar job flow
measures in 1999. In the year 2000, on the other hand, there seem to be clear
differences between the two sectors of the economy, as job creation is more than
double in the non-manufacturing sector. We can, however, also see that the rise in
heterogeneous employment behaviour in 2000 can be mainly attributed to the non-
manufacturing sector, which makes the estimates in this sector much more impre-
cise than in manufacturing. The large standard error in the job creation rate does
not allow us to say unequivocally that non-manufacturing has a larger job creation
in the year 2000 than manufacturing. We infer, however, that non-manufacturing
15 Pos and neg are the two job flow measures from which the other three measures are derived. The boot-
strapping procedure treats the sample as a population and draws 1000 random samples with replacement,
then calculates the mean and the standard deviation of the job flow measure in question. This standard
deviation is then the bootstrapped standard error. If there is more variation in e.g., job creation than in job
destruction, this will show up as a larger standard deviation of the first job flow measure. In other words,
very precise estimates hint at uniform behaviour across the sampled firms, while imprecise estimates hint
at heterogeneous behaviour.
Table 3. Gross flow rates for overall sample























Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, based on 1000 repetitions; pos = job creation rate, neg =














Table 4. Job flow rates and shares by sector: 1999 and 2000
Year Sector pos neg gross net excess jcsh jdsh szsh n










0.573 0.608 0.637 1259
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Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, based on 1000 repetitions; jcsh, jdsh and szsh denote share in job creation, job destruction and
size share respectively.
Source: Amadeus dataset.
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contributes disproportionately to job creation in both years, while its destruction
shares are only marginally higher than its size shares.
The estimates of the job flow rates of the manufacturing sector are clearly more
precise. It is, therefore, noteworthy that the 95 percent confidence intervals of all
but one of the job flow rates in ‘traditional’ manufacturing given in Table 4 include
the values in Table 5, where we report the same measures using Derzhkomstat
census data. 
The empirical evidence on gross job flows in manufacturing in other tran-
sition countries generally shows low creation, high destruction and low excess
reallocation rates in the early phase of transition. For example, Haltiwanger and
Vodopivec (2002) report a job creation rate of 3.1 percent and a job destruction
rate of 8.3 percent for the early period of transition in Estonia. Konings, Lehmann
and Schaffer (1996) present a job creation rate of 0.6 percent and a job destruction
rate of 16.5 percent for Polish state-owned manufacturing firms in 1990 and 1991.
Brown and Earle (2002b) show a similar relationship between job creation and
destruction in the ‘traditional’ Russian manufacturing sector in the early reform
period (1992–96), with an average job creation rate of 2.1 percent and an average
job destruction rate of 11.2 percent.16 Evidence on job flows for all sectors points to
less dominance of job destruction and, therefore, higher excess reallocation rates.
The latter rates reach Western levels especially in later stages of transition. For
example, Faggio and Konings (2001) report job creation and destruction rates of
4.3 and 5.2 percent, respectively, for all sectors in Slovenia in the years 1994–97,
implying an excess reallocation rate of 8.6 percent. Using a different database,
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003) establish job creation and destruction rates of
10.1 percent and 9.2 percent for all Slovenian sectors at the end of the nineties,
implying an excess reallocation rate of 18.4 percent. In the light of these numbers,
job reallocation in Ukraine, relatively low in 1999, was certainly comparable to job
reallocation in other transition economies in the year 2000. The 18.4 percent excess
16 The implied excess job reallocation rates for the three countries are 6.3 percent, 1.7 percent and 4.2
percent, respectively.
Table 5. Gross job flows in manufacturing – Census-type Derzhkomstat data
Year pos neg gross net excess n
1997 0.016 0.099 0.115 −0.083 0.032 6189
1998 0.020 0.081 0.101 −0.061 0.040 6189
1999 0.021 0.079 0.100 −0.058 0.042 6189
2000 0.034 0.079 0.113 −0.045 0.068 6189
Note: See Table 3.
Source: Ukrainian Statistical Office – Derzhkomstat.
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job reallocation rate of the non-manufacturing sector points to a particularly
impressive amount of job reallocation for this year. While the estimated job flow
rates for Ukraine seem to point to a clear hiatus between the nineties and the
year 200017, unfortunately we cannot know from one data point whether the bet-
ter performance of the year 2000 in terms of job reallocation is a temporary ‘blip’
or the beginning of a sustained trend. 
The one-year persistence rates of annual job flows in Table 6 clearly demon-
strate that these flows are not of a temporary nature. Roughly 80 percent of jobs
created in 1999 are still there one year later, and about 90 percent of all jobs
destroyed in 1999 do not reappear in 2000. Both these rates are roughly 10 percent-
age points higher than those presented for the US by Davis and Haltiwanger
(1999). Different persistence patterns emerge in the two sectors of the economy. Job
creation and destruction persistence are equal and roughly 85 percent in manufac-
turing, while in non-manufacturing the destruction persistence is, at 92 percent,
roughly 20 percentage points higher than the persistence of new jobs. Surprisingly
the non-manufacturing sector has the higher destruction persistence.
Behind the aggregate job flow figures tremendously heterogeneous behaviour
in job reallocation within sectors occurs as the decomposition of the excess job
reallocation at the two-digit level in Table 7 shows. As in Western economies a
large majority of job shifts takes place within sectors. However, in 2000 between
sector job shifts reach one-third of all job shifts, which is a very large fraction in
international perspective.
17 This hiatus is also visible in the figures presented by Brown and Earle (2002b).
Table 6. One-year persistence rates for annual job flows: 
Overall sample and by sector
 
Category jcpers jdpers













Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, based on 1000 repetitions; jcpers =
job creation persistence rate, jdpers =  job destruction persistence rate.
Source: Amadeus dataset.
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Cross-tabulated evidence on firm size and job flows reported in Konings,
Kupets and Lehmann (2002) gives a somewhat inconsistent picture and is not
presented here for brevity. However, small firms in Ukraine seem to contribute
more to job creation than we observe in Western economies. But this size effect
could be closely connected to firm age or ownership type: young firms and new
private firms tend to have small employment levels. While there is unfortunately
no reliable information on the age of the firm, we can condition on ownership type
and see whether the size effect is partially explained by composition effects.
Table 8 presents the five job flow measures and the three share statistics dis-
aggregated by three ownership types, i.e., privatized, new private and state-owned
firms. There are striking differences with respect to job creation between new
private firms and privatized and state-owned firms. New private firms are much
more dynamic as far as job creation is concerned, leading to positive employment
growth in both years. We also observe more heterogeneity in the employment
behaviour of new private firms as shown by the much higher excess job realloca-
tion rate in both years. Privatized firms in particular but state-owned ones as well
predominantly destroy jobs, while new private firms both create and destroy jobs,
a finding that was also established for the Russian economy (Acquisti and
Lehmann, 2000). The good job creation performance of new private firms in both
years could imply that there is a genuine ownership type effect at work or a size
effect. Below, we will try to disentangle these size and ownership effects properly
within a regression framework.  
New private firms contribute a disproportionately large number of jobs to the
pool of new jobs, while their contribution to job destruction corresponds roughly
to their employment share. The difference between state-owned firms and
privatized firms on these measures is striking. Relative to their employment share





1999 Manufacturing 0.952 0.048
1999 Non-manufacturing 0.972 0.028
2000 Manufacturing 0.666 0.334
2000 Non-manufacturing 0.622 0.378
Note: The sector is excluded if the number of firms in this sector is less than 10 (sectors excluded are:
Mining of coal and lignite, Manufacture of tobacco products, Manufacture of office machinery and com-
puters, Recycling; Water transport, Air transport, Post and telecommunications, Financial intermedia-
tion, Renting services, Computer and related activities, Public administration and defence, Education,
Sewage and refuse disposal, Other service activities).
Source: Amadeus dataset.
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privatized firms create fewer new jobs and destroy more jobs than do state-owned
firms. The figures on job creation shares also clearly show that because of their
large employment base both privatized and state-owned firms still contributed
the lion’s share of created jobs in the Ukrainian economy in the reported period.
Cross tabulations of groups of sectors categorized according to the relative level
of openness and their job flows, based on the different indices and trade areas,
do not exhibit any statistically significant differences and are not shown here.18
Regression analysis seems to be a more appropriate way to shed light on the
impact of relative openness on firm-level and sector-level employment adjustment. 
5. Evidence from firm level and sector level regressions
The gross job flow rates which we documented in the last section are linked to
the individual firm’s employment decision. Factors that influence firm-level em-
ployment will most probably also shape the pattern of gross job flows in the aggre-
gate. In this section therefore, we initially explore which factors drive firm-level
employment decisions. This may allow us to disentangle, for instance, the effects
18 We split sectors into three groups; those with low relative openness, belonging to the lower third of the
distribution of the index, those with medium relative openness and those with high relative openness,
belonging to the medium and upper thirds of the distribution of the index respectively. The cross tabula-
tions based on the three indices and the three trading areas are available upon request.
Table 8. Job flow rates and shares by ownership type – overall sample
Year Ownership type pos neg gross net excess jcsh jdsh szsh n










0.503 0.619 0.567 1413










0.139 0.012 0.019 132










0.356 0.366 0.413 685










0.461 0.612 0.558 1413










0.057 0.035 0.021 132










0.482 0.350 0.419 685
Note: See Tables 3 and 4.
Source: Amadeus dataset.
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of ownership and size to establish the importance of ownership for the job gener-
ation process. In addition, the relationship between the relative openness of a sector
in which a firm operates and the firm’s employment growth and job reallocation
can be investigated, holding factors like size and ownership type constant.
First, an employment growth equation for the years 1999 and 2000 of the fol-
lowing form is estimated:
(1)
size is measured by average contemporaneous size, in order to avoid the regression-
to-the-mean fallacy. The variable open is the relative openness index averaged
over the years 1996–98, with the argument x equal to total, import or export. The
variables newprivate and privatized are ownership dummies, while inddum is an
industry dummy and λ t is a year dummy. The indicator variable I(ij) takes the
value one when firm i is in industry j. The error term is heteroscedastic and
includes unobserved factors, which are assumed to be similar for each firm across
the years, i.e., the εit’s are assumed clustered for each i. However, since ownership
changes in the sampled firms occurred no later than 1996 and since we have taken
the average of the openness index over the years 1996–98, the ownership dummies
and the openness index are by construction not correlated with the error term. We
also follow the firm growth literature in assuming that average size is weakly
exogeneous. Consequently, as long as this latter assumption holds and as long as
we correct for the heteroscedastic and clustered nature of the error term, equation
(1) is consistently estimated with OLS.
In the case where the openness index is based on exports we extend equation
(1) by additionally interacting the index with a dummy variable when firm i had
positive levels of exports in the years 1996–98. This allows us to test the hypothesis
that firms in an export intensive sector that export have different employment
adjustment from firms that do not. We also experimented with more complex
specifications, allowing for interactions of size with ownership types and relative
openness. These interactive terms were, however, jointly insignificant.19
A second estimation concerns the determination of firm-level job reallocation.
We employ the same right-hand-side variables as in equation (1), but replace the
dependent variable by the modulus of the growth rate.
Finally, in order to establish whether a sector’s relative openness affects its job
flows we estimate models of the following form, pooling data over 1999 and 2000:
(2)
19 These regressions are available upon request.
g size newprivate privatized I ij open xit it i i j j   ( )     ( ) ( )= + + + + ∑β β β β β0 1 2 3 4ln
inddumj ij j t i t it + + +∑ ∑δ γ λ ε
Job Flow median size new private share privatized sharej j j j_    _  _ _  _= + + +α α α α0 1 2 3
open x j t t jt ( )  + + +∑α γ λ ετ4
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where Job_Flowj = {posj, negj, netj, grossj, excessj}, median_sizej is the median size of
firms in sector j, new_private_sharej is the share of new private firms in sector j,
privatized_sharej is the share of privatized firms in sector j and openness(x)j and λt
denote the same as in equation (1). The error term is heteroscedastic and clustered
across years. Again, we assume the right-hand-side variables to be strictly or
weakly exogeneous, rendering OLS estimation of the various models based on
equation (2) consistent.
Turning to the evidence, the negative relationship between firm size and gross
flows of jobs is confirmed for firm-level employment flows in the case of non-
weighted regressions with respect to the entire sample and non-manufacturing as
columns 1 and 3 in Table 9a show. When we weigh these regressions by employ-
ment, this negative effect is attenuated (columns 2 and 4) implying that some large
firms contribute disproportionately to employment growth. The influence of these
larger firms can also be seen with respect to manufacturing where an insignificant
correlation of size and growth turns into a small positive size effect when employ-
ment weights are added to the regression (cf. columns 5 and 6). Since the correla-
tion of size and growth is different for manufacturing and non-manufacturing, firm
size alone is an important factor that can explain differences in turbulence or gross
flows of jobs between the two sectors. 
Controlling for size, new private firms have much higher growth rates than
firms in the other two ownership classes, state-owned and privatized firms. While
survival bias might play a role here, work on firm-level growth equations done for
market economies and emerging economies has established that much of potential
selection bias is eliminated by including size of the firm in the regression (e.g.,
Evans, 1987; Konings and Xavier, 2001). While new private firms have higher aver-
age growth rates in the manufacturing sector than in the non-manufacturing sector,
it is also noteworthy that privatized firms have the same employment growth as
have state-owned firms. Such a finding was established by Konings, Lehmann and
Schaffer (1996) for Polish manufacturing and by Richter and Schaffer (1996) for
Russian manufacturing at the start of transition. In contrast, Brown and Earle
(2002a) find a small positive effect of privatization on employment growth in the
Russian manufacturing sector. Our result would suggest that in Ukraine privatiza-
tion has so far had little effect on the employment behaviour of firms. 
Tables 9b and 9c investigate the impact of relative openness of a sector in
manufacturing on firm-level employment growth.20 The results of Table 9b use
relative openness indices calculated on the basis of total trade flows and imports.
They show a strong positive effect of the relative openness of a sector in which a
firm operates, on its employment growth. If we understand a higher relative open-
ness index based on imports as increased import competition, then our results state
that firms, which have been operating in sectors with more import competition,


















Table 9a. Estimates of firm-level net employment growth rate (Pooled OLS estimates)















































R2 0.050 0.045 0.054 0.047 0.057 0.055
N 4460 4460 1954 1954 2506 2506
Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%/10%) significance level. All
regressions include two-digit sector dummies and year dummies. Omitted ownership category: state-owned firms.
Source: Amadeus dataset.
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exhibit more employment growth. Table 9c gives estimates that use relative open-
ness indices based on exports. Several important points emerge from these results.
First, we observe a positive impact of relative openness on employment growth for
world exports and exports to the EU area, while exports to the CIS do not seem to
affect firm-level employment growth. Secondly, only those firms that actually
export to the world and the EU experience higher employment growth when they
are located in a relatively export intensive sector: the coefficient on the relative
openness index turns insignificant when we add an interactive term, which links
relative openness with the incidence of firm-level exports. Finally, this interactive
term reduces the effect of the new private dummy, implying that part of the good
growth performance of new private firms can be attributed to their operation in
export markets.
The quintessence of this evidence seems to be that competitive pressure,
whether brought on by import competition or competition in export markets leads
to better firm performance in product markets and enhanced efficiency resulting in
larger employment growth. The results also suggest that firms operating in export
markets of the CIS might not be exposed to the same competitive pressures as
firms operating in export markets in the world at large and in the EU. 
The firm-level job reallocation regressions in Table 10a show that smaller
firms engage in more job reallocation, as do new private firms in the manufactur-
ing sector. Table 10b, on the other hand, establishes that import competition
originating from the world at large and from EU countries lowers job reallocation
Table 9b. Estimates of firm-level net employment growth rate in manufacturing 
(Pooled OLS estimates)



















































R2 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057
N 2,506 2,506 2,506 2,506 2,506 2,506
Note: Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets; *** denotes statistically significant at the
1% significance level. All regressions include two-digit sector dummies and year dummies. Omitted


















Table 9c. Estimates of firm-level net employment growth rate in manufacturing (Pooled OLS estimates)

























































R2 0.057 0.044 0.057 0.043 0.057 0.046
N 2,506 2,012 2,506 2,012 2,506 2,012
Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%) significance level. All regressions













Table 10a. Estimates of firm-level employment reallocation rate (Pooled OLS estimates)















































R2 0.058 0.055 0.044 0.037 0.065 0.066
N 4,460 4,460 1,954 1,954 2,506 2,506
Note: Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%/10%) significance level. All


















Table 10b. Estimates of firm-level employment reallocation rate in manufacturing (Pooled OLS estimates)

















































R2 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065
N 2,506 2,506 2,506 2,506 2,506 2,506
Note: Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%) significance level. All regres-













Table 10c. Estimates of firm-level employment reallocation rate in manufacturing (Pooled OLS estimates)

























































R2 0.065 0.039 0.065 0.042 0.065 0.040
N 2,506 2,012 2,506 2,052 2,506 2,012
Note: Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%) significance level. All regres-
sions include two-digit sector dummies and year dummies. Omitted ownership category: state-owned firms.
Source: Amadeus dataset.
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of manufacturing firms. Competition in export markets in the EU also lowers
firm level job reallocation as the last column of Table 10c highlights. The result
that firms experiencing more competitive pressures engage in less job realloca-
tion is somewhat unexpected. It could be that those firms in Ukraine, which for
some time have been exposed to more competitive pressures, have their main
job reallocation efforts already behind them in 1999 and 2000. But, since this
explanation is not entirely satisfactory, we turn to sector-level regressions where
we can directly investigate the impact of a sector’s relative openness on its job
flows.
Table 11, which displays coefficients on the openness index for the five sector-
level job flow rates, reveals some interesting patterns. If we take the world and the
EU as trading areas, export flows seem to be much more important in the deter-
mination of sector-level employment adjustment than import flows. Sectors, which
are more export intensive, create more and destroy fewer jobs leading to increased
employment growth. In contrast, sectors being exposed to strong import competi-
tion from the CIS destroy fewer jobs and also engage in less job reallocation than
sectors with weaker import competition from this trading area. The significant
positive impact on the excess job reallocation rate in column 8 tells us that sectors
with relatively strong export links to the EU genuinely reallocate more jobs than
sectors lacking these links. On the other hand, sectors experiencing strong import
competition from the EU exhibit lower genuine job reallocation, as the negative
entry for the excess job reallocation rate in column 9 shows. So, more product
market competition in EU export markets seems to increase job turbulence at the
sector level, while increased import competition from EU products seems to
decrease it. It is noteworthy, finally, that stronger links with the world and CIS
trading areas have no impact on the excess job reallocation rate.
6. Conclusions
This paper documents and analyses gross job flows and their determinants in
Ukraine, using a dataset of more than 2,200 Ukrainian firms operating in manufac-
turing and non-manufacturing in the years 1998–2000.
There are several important findings in the paper. First, job destruction is
dominating job creation in both 1999 and 2000, with destruction rates of 11 percent
in 1999 and of 8 percent in 2000, while the creation rates are 3 and 6 percent,
respectively. This result in conjunction with the arguments put forth by Aslund
(2002) leads us to believe that the Ukrainian economy is still at an early phase of
transition. A very clear-cut result is the strong positive effect of new private firms
on net employment growth, a finding established for other transition economies as
well. At the same time, we do not find differences in the employment growth of
state-owned and privatized firms. We also observe an inverse relationship between












Table 11. Impact of relative openness on job flows at the two-digit sector level



























































































Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors in brackets; *** (**/*) denotes statistically significant at the 1% (5%/10%) significance level.
Coefficients come from OLS estimates of the various models based on equation (2).
Source: Amadeus dataset.
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An inverse correlation between size and the firm-level reallocation rate is, how-
ever, present in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing.
In manufacturing, the relative openness of a sector in which a firm operates is
an important factor of firm-level employment adjustment, whether we look at total
trade flows, import flows or export flows. Firms exposed to more import com-
petition have superior employment growth, whether this competition arises from
imports from the world at large, from the CIS or from the EU. In contrast, only
firms that export to the world at large and the EU and are located in more export
intensive sectors have faster employment growth. We also find that job reallocation
is lower for firms that are experiencing either strong import competition or com-
petitive pressures in export markets. This result only holds for firms engaged in
world and EU trade. It might be attributed to the fact that firms that have operated
in a more competitive environment for some time require less reshuffling of jobs
in the reported period than those firms with less competitive pressures in the past. 
The final set of results deals with the impact of the relative openness of a sector
on its gross job flows. These results are also divided along geographic lines. For
world and EU trade export intensive sectors create more jobs and destroy fewer,
while sectors that strongly compete with imports from the CIS destroy fewer jobs,
but have no increased job creation. Sectors with strong export links to the EU also
show higher excess job reallocation rates, i.e., exhibit increased genuine job reallo-
cation, while sectors confronted with strong competition from EU imports actually
show lower genuine job turnover.
While trade flows are clearly important in explaining employment adjustment
of Ukrainian manufacturing firms and sectors, the presented results are of an
exploratory nature given the limited data at hand. More work with time series data
is required to understand these results better. Future work needs to understand in
particular why strong trade links with the world at large and especially with the
EU impose discipline on firms and sectors, which seems substantially weaker
when it comes to trade flows with the CIS. 
References
Acquisti, A. and Lehmann, H. (2000). ‘Job creation and job destruction in the Russian
Federation’, Trinity Economic Paper No. 2000/1, Trinity College, Dublin.
Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1994). ‘Growth and unemployment’, Review of Economic Studies,
61(3), pp. 477–94.
Aslund, A. (2002). ‘Why has Ukraine returned to economic growth?’ Institute of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 15, Kiev, Ukraine.
Baldwin, J., Dunne, T. and Haltiwanger, J. (1998). ‘A comparison of job creation and job
destruction in Canada and the United States’, The Review of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. LXXX (3), pp. 347–56.
Bernard, A., Eaton, J., Jensen, B., Kortum, S. (2003). ‘Plants and productivity in international
trade’, forthcoming in American Economic Review.
Gross Job Flows in Ukraine 353
Bilsen, V. and Konings, J. (1998). ‘Job creation, job destruction and growth of newly estab-
lished, privatized and state-owned enterprises in transition economies: Survey evidence
from Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 26(3), pp. 429–45.
Blanchard, O. and Kremer, M. (1997). ‘Disorganization’, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
112(4), pp. 1091–1126.
Brown, D. and Earle, J. (2002a). ‘Gross job flows in Russian industry before and after
reforms: Has destruction become more creative?’ Journal of Comparative Economics, 30(1),
pp. 96–133.
Brown, D. and Earle, J. (2002b). ‘Job reallocation and productivity growth under alternative
economic systems and policies: Evidence from the Soviet transition’, IZA Discussion
Paper No. 644, Bonn, Germany.
Davis, S. and Haltiwanger, J. (1999). ‘Gross job flows’, in Ashenfelter, O. and D.  Card (eds.),
Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Elsevier, pp. 2711–2805.
Davis, S. and Haltiwanger, J. (1992). ‘Gross job creation, gross job destruction and employ-
ment reallocation’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), pp. 819–63.
Davis, S., Haltiwanger, J. and Schuh, S. (1996). Job Creation and Job Destruction, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Efron, B. and Tibshirani, R. (1993). An Introduction to the Bootstrap, New York: Chapman and
Hall.
Evans, D. S. (1987). ‘Tests of alternative theories of firm growth’, Journal of Political Economy,
95(4), pp. 657–74.
Faggio, G. and Konings, J. (2001). ‘Job creation, job destruction and employment growth in
transition countries in the 90’s’, IZA Discussion Paper No. 242, Bonn, Germany.
Haltiwanger, J. and Vodopivec, M. (2003), ‘Worker flows, job flows and firm wage policies:
An analysis of Slovenia’, Economics of Transition (this symposium).
Haltiwanger, J. and Vodopivec, M. (2002). ‘Gross worker and job flows in a transition eco-
nomy: An analysis of Estonia’, Labour Economics, 9(5), pp. 601–30.
Klein, M. W., Schuh, S. and Triest, R. K. (2003). ‘Job creation, job destruction and the real
exchange rate’, Journal of International Economics, 59(2), pp. 239–65.
Konings, J., Kupets, O. and Lehmann, H. (2002). ‘Gross job flows in Ukraine: Size, ownership
and trade effects’, IZA Discussion Paper No. 675, Bonn, Germany.
Konings, J., Lehmann, H. and Schaffer, M. (1996). ‘Employment growth, job creation and job
destruction in Polish industry: 1988–91’, Labour Economics, 3, pp. 299–317.
Konings, J. and Lehmann, H. (2002). ‘Marshall and labor demand in Russia: Going back to
basics’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 30(1), pp. 134–59.
Konings, J. and Walsh, P. (1999a). ‘Disorganization in the process of transition’, Economics of
Transition, 7(1), pp. 29–46.
Konings, J. and Walsh, P. (1999b). ‘Employment dynamics of newly established and tradi-
tional firms: A comparison of Russia and Ukraine’, LICOS Working Paper 81/1999, Centre
for Transition Economics, KU Leuven.
Konings, J. and Xavier, A. (2001). ‘Firm growth and survival in a transition economy’,
mimeo, LICOS, Centre for Transition Economics, KU Leuven.
Levinsohn, J. (1999). ‘Employment responses to international liberalization in Chile’, Journal
of International Economics, 47(2), pp. 321–44.
Repkine, A. and Walsh, P. (1999). ‘Evidence of European trade and investment U-shaping
industrial output in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania’, Journal of Comparative
Economics, 27(4), pp. 730–52.
354 Konings, Kupets and Lehmann
Richter, A. and Schaffer, M. (1996). ‘Growth, investment, and newly-established firms in
Russian manufacturing’, in Commander, S., Fan, Q. and Schaffer, M. (eds.), Enterprise
Restructuring and Economic Policy in Russia, EDI/World Bank: Washington, DC.
Roland, G. and Verdier, T. (1999). ‘Transition and the output fall’, Economics of Transition,
7(1), pp. 1–28.
Appendix 1
Table A1. Percentage change in trade flows in manufacturing in 1994–98 
and 1994–2001
Total Trade Flows Imports Exports
All CIS EU All CIS EU All CIS EU
1994–98 45.5 −7.9 169.8 80.8 7.7 207.5 24.7 −17.0 124.4
1994–2001 66.7 −19.9 292.5 72.2 −26.4 251.2 63.5 −16.1 342.3
Source: Ukrainian State Customs Committee. Only sectors used in the manufacturing sample of the
Amadeus dataset are included.
Table A2. Share of trade flows in manufacturing to CIS and EU countries
Year Total trade flows Imports Exports
EU/All CIS/All EU/All CIS/All EU/All CIS/All
1994 12.2 55.0 18.0 55.0 8.8 54.9
1995 16.8 51.8 24.4 49.1 12.3 53.4
1996 20.6 40.1 27.4 33.3 16.1 44.7
1997 22.5 32.9 41.6 16.1 11.3 42.9
1998 22.6 34.8 30.6 32.8 15.8 36.6
1999 22.4 32.2 29.6 34.0 17.2 30.9
2000 21.9 35.5 31.6 39.4 15.6 33.1
2001 28.7 26.4 36.7 23.5 23.8 28.2
Source: Ukrainian State Customs Committee. Only sectors used in the manufacturing sample of the
Amadeus dataset are included.
Gross Job Flows in Ukraine 355
Appendix 2
Definitions of variables used in regressions
Employment is the average number of employees over the year.
Size is the average of the firm’s employment in two successive years (e.g.,
size99 = (emp99 + emp98)/2).
Manufacturing is a dummy variable equal to one if the enterprise’s main eco-
nomic activity according to the two-digit NACE-Rev.1 classification falls into the
interval [10, 41].
State is a dummy variable equal to one if the enterprise has state or municipal
ownership or if the enterprise has been partly privatized before 1999 and more than
50 percent of shares belong to the state. Information about the type of ownership
Table A3. Summary statistics of relative openness indices
Index Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev.
Trade-all 0 6.23 0.74 1.67 1.91
Import-all 0 10.77 0.84 1.99 2.87
Export-all 0 9.93 0.57 1.45 2.30
Trade-CIS 0 5.74 0.56 1.38 1.58
Import-CIS 0 15.31 0.64 1.75 3.14
Export-CIS 0 4.55 0.55 1.21 1.36
Trade-EU 0 13.48 0.98 1.99 2.73
Import-EU 0 7.18 0.99 1.76 2.00
Export-EU 0 34.88 0.32 2.42 6.80
Source: Own calculations.
Table A4. Spearman rank correlation coefficient
Correlation between All countries CIS EU


















Note: p-values in brackets.
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comes from the database of the Ukrainian State Property Fund accompanied with
information about the registered legal form and name of the enterprise, and the
date of its incorporation.
Privatized is a dummy variable equal to one if the enterprise has been priva-
tized before 1999 and less than 50 percent of shares belong to the state.
New Private is a dummy variable equal to one if the enterprise is 100 percent
privately owned and newly established, i.e., it has never been a state enterprise.
Relative openness index of a sector based on total trade is the relative share
of imports and exports of the two-digit NACE sector j in year t (1996–98), weighted
by its employment share in 1996:
Openj,t = [(Importj,t + Exportj,t)/(Importtot,t + Exporttot,t)]/(employmentj,96/employmenttot,96).
Import and export volumes by countries of origin and destination (in thousands
US dollars) come from the Ukrainian State Customs Committee data based on the
six-digit Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). The
employment share of the sector in 1996 was calculated using the Derzhkomstat
dataset.
Relative openness index of a sector based on exports is the relative share of
exports of the two-digit NACE sector j in year t (1996–98), weighted by its employ-
ment share in 1996:
Open(export)j,t = (Exportj,t/Exporttot,t)/(employmentj,96/employmenttot,96).
Firm-level export dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s aver-
age export in 1996–98 is larger than 0. Firm-level export volumes come from the
Derzhkomstat dataset.
Relative openness index of a sector based on imports is the relative share of
imports of the two-digit NACE sector j in year t (1996–98), weighted by its employ-
ment share in 1996:
Open(import)j,t = (Importj,t/Importtot,t)/(employmentj,96/employmenttot,96).
These indices are averaged over the years 1996–98 and calculated for the three
geographic areas world, CIS and EU, leading to the nine indices shown in
Table A3.
